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China in Latin America:
Competition in the United States’ 
“Strategic Backyard” 
Nele Noesselt and Ana Soliz-Landivar
In May 2013, both China and the United States engaged in high-level travel diplomacy 
with selected states in the Caribbean and Latin America. Apart from bilateral trade 
agreements, China and the United States have shifted their engagement with the region 
toward high politics.
Analysis
China’s increased interest in the Caribbean and Latin America has been deemed a threat 
to the United States in its “strategic backyard.” However, the complexity of Beijing’s 
relationships in the region warrants a more detailed analysis. 
  After the 9/11 attacks and the US-led “war on terror” in other regions of the world, 
Latin America did not rank high on the US foreign policy agenda. But since China has 
become Latin America’s second largest trading partner and has started to establish 
strategic partnerships in the region, the United States seems to have become more 
concerned about these developments.
  Latin America is employing a multiangular approach by strengthening its ties with 
both the United States and China as well as other extraregional partners. In part, 
this has forced the United States to adapt its strategy accordingly and to offer the 
region a new type of cooperative partnership.
  China’s interest in the Caribbean and Latin America is still primarily driven by 
access to resources and markets. However, it has started to upgrade its cooperation 
with selected states in the region to include issues of high politics. It is building 
gateways to the region by identifying key players in the region’s territorial subunits.
  Apart from bilateral relations, China has recently turned to regional organizations 
and institutions. 
Keywords: China, Latin America, interregional cooperation, space technology, strategic 
backyard
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Charm Competition? 
With the annual session of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress in March 2013, the Chinese lead-
ership transition has been successfully com-
pleted. Although Xi Jinping – the new general 
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and 
president of the People’s Republic of China – 
visited Russia and Africa in his first trip abroad 
(where he also attended the annual BRICS sum-
mit), his second trip saw him visit Latin Amer-
ica and the United States. 
The Chinese state visit to Latin America and 
the Caribbean took place shortly after US presi-
dent Barack Obama had traveled to Mexico and 
Costa Rica and met with the heads of states of 
the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana 
(2–4 May 2013). It also followed US vice pres-
ident Joe Biden’s attempts to strengthen US 
presence in its “strategic backyard” by visiting 
to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Bra-
zil (27–31 May 2013). The destinations on Xi’s 
roadmap – whether by chance or by strategic 
calculation – also included Trinidad and Toba-
go, Costa Rica, and Mexico. While China – as it 
has widely been acknowledged – is bidding for 
access to energy resources and raw materials 
to fuel its national economy, the United States 
seems to be driven by geostrategic and security 
concerns. The real constellations, however, are 
obviously not that simple.
Neither the United States nor China exclu-
sively relies on bilateral agreements and stra-
tegic partnerships – though this has somehow 
remained the central dimension for their inter-
actions with selected states in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The United States, for ex-
ample, has established a high-level bilateral di-
alogue with Colombia on multiple issues (e.g., 
social inclusion, human rights, energy, and se-
curity) (2010) and also supports the “Plan Co-
lombia,” a program against drug production. 
Furthermore, a bilateral free trade agreement 
(FTA) between both countries came into effect 
in 2012.1 But the United States and China have 
also turned to multilateral regional engage-
ment and have started to strengthen their inter-
action with regional organizations and institu-
tions. Along this line, the United States is seek-
1 In Latin America, the United States has established free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with the Dominican Republic (2006), Chile 
(2004), and Mexico (1994).
ing to become an observer in regional organi-
zations such as the Pacific Alliance (Colombia, 
Chile, Mexico, and Peru). Vice President Biden 
also attended the Conference of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM)2 and signed a trade 
and investment framework agreement (TIFA), 
which strengthened cooperation in the fields of 
education, security, and renewable energy be-
tween both sides. 
Biden’s tour ended in Brazil, one of the 
world’s new rising economic power centers. 
This visit was generally in keeping with earlier 
high-level exchanges between the United States 
and Brazil, which started with Obama’s visit to 
Brasilia in March 2011. The United States, once 
more, asked Brazil to take on more global re-
sponsibilities commensurate with the country’s 
new economic power. 
Only a few weeks later, Xi Jinping started 
his Latin America tour to Trinidad and Tobago, 
Costa Rica, and Mexico (31 May–6 June 2013) 
before flying to California. Apart from social-
ist Cuba, with which China maintains a spe-
cial relationship, Trinidad and Tobago was the 
first Caribbean country to ever be visited by a 
Chinese president. This reflects China’s flex-
ible approach to foreign relations, which en-
tails a global strategy based on the pluraliza-
tion and diversification of diplomatic contacts 
also including smaller states – although rela-
tions with great powers and the rising econo-
mies are of major importance. A closer look at 
these bilateral interactions reveals that China’s 
Latin America approach is not just driven by 
economic interests but also strategic concerns. 
Latin America poses an interesting challenge 
to China’s foreign policy principles as the ma-
jority of Central American countries still dip-
lomatically recognize Taiwan (the Republic of 
China). Contrary to usual practice, China main-
tains strong economic ties with these states 
and does not impose any sanctions. Howev-
er, those states that shift their recognition in fa-
2 The member states of CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, 
The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and To-
bago. CARICOM associate members are Anguilla, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Cai-
cos Islands. CARICOM focuses on the energy sector. Other is-
sues include climate change, the Pan Caribbean Partnership 
against HIV/AIDS, UWI-Caricom, Information and Commu-
nication Technology for Development, and, finally, CARI-
COM/Cariforum Food Security. 
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vor of China are highly rewarded. While Trin-
idad and Tobago was among those that estab-
lished diplomatic contacts with China in the 
1970s, Costa Rica is an example of those states 
that have become co-opted and now officially 
recognize Beijing’s “One China” policy. In re-
turn for Costa Rica’s change of stance, China 
invested heavily in local infrastructure by con-
structing hospitals, schools, and roads. Follow-
ing the examples of Chile and Peru, Costa Rica 
was the third Latin American country to sign a 
FTA with China, which came into effect in 2011. 
During his visit in May 2013, President Xi an-
nounced that China would invest 3 billion USD 
in loans in 10 Caribbean countries and Costa 
Rica in the years to come.
China is also utilizing a multilateral ap-
proach. In 2008, for instance, China became a 
member of the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), thus enabling China to invest in 
large regional infrastructure projects. China 
has also become a member of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS). Moreover, be-
ing a socialist country, it actively supports the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) 
and has provided more than 50 billion USD in 
loans for the alliance’s two leading countries: 
Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, China is 
looking to strengthen relations with the recent-
ly created Comunidad de Estados de América 
Latina y el Caribe (CELAC). During Xi’s offi-
cial state visit in June 2013, he also met with 
the following members of CARICOM: Antigua 
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Domi-
nica, Granada, Guyana, Surinam, and Jamaica.
Mexico, which Xi had previously visited as 
China’s vice president in 2009, was his final 
stop in Latin America. In June 2013, Xi Jinping 
and the Mexican president Peña Nieto signed 
the “Pacto Tequila,” thereby deepening politi-
cal dialogue and further institutionalizing the 
two countries’ commercial interactions. In the 
past, bilateral relations had been overshad-
owed by competition for export markets and 
growing trade imbalances. Even though China 
and Mexico had signed a strategic partnership 
in 2003, Mexico continued to act against Chi-
nese interests in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) for fear of losing its privileged position 
in the US market. The election of a new Mex-
ican government in 2013 provided an oppor-
tunity to relaunch the partnership. Mexico is 
not only among the group of catching-up econ-
omies, it is also a member of the Trans-Pacif-
ic Partnership (TPP) – thus integrating it with 
North America, Japan, and South East Asia. 
China, which is not a member of this organiza-
tion, might have a strong interest in maintain-
ing close contact through strategic partnerships 
with selected TPP member states (Kahn 2013).
In the eyes of some Latin American coun-
tries, China offers an alternative to condition-
based cooperation as practiced by the United 
States. For instance, programs run by the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with 
Andean countries see the latter required to re-
duce coca leaf production in exchange for eco-
nomic cooperation. By positioning themselves 
as members of the developing world, Chinese 
politicians have managed to reduce threat per-
ceptions among the Latin American countries. 
Instead, interactions are presented as win-win 
constellations, with China investing heavily 
in local infrastructure and health in return for 
access to resources and raw materials; Beijing 
does not openly pursue any kind of norm ex-
port or transfer of its own political system. 
The Red Dragon in Latin America
China’s trade with Latin America has increased 
exponentially over the last few years, amount-
ing to about 261 billion USD in 2012. China has 
become Latin America’s second largest trading 
partner and is likely to soon become its second 
biggest investor. Chinese investment strategy 
has also undergone a twofold transformation. 
First, investment previously flowed in the di-
rection of the Caribbean tax havens of the Cay-
man Islands and the British Virgin Islands dur-
ing the 1990s, which received about 90 percent 
of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Latin America. The focus then shifted to invest-
ment in the exploitation of energy and resourc-
es (e.g., copper, iron ore, oil) and, later on, in 
the automobile and telecommunication sectors 
(Rosales/Kuwayama 2012:107). Second, while 
Chinese investment originally focused on bi-
lateral relations, it now includes multilater-
al channels. In March 2012, the IDB and Chi-
na jointly announced a plan to invest 1 billion 
USD in Latin American markets. According to 
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the IDB, Chinese state-owned banks provided 
loans to Latin America totaling 75 billion USD 
between 2005 and 2010. 
Apart from energy resources (still China’s 
biggest investment area in Latin America), Chi-
na is also interested in agricultural products 
given its huge population and subsequent de-
pendence on food imports. Argentina has be-
come a central partner in China’s food supply 
chain, with the major share of its grain, soy-
bean, and meat production being exported to 
China. During the visit of Chinese vice presi-
dent Li Yuanchao in May 2013, Argentina and 
China signed four new agreements covering 
not only agriculture and resources, but also 
the field of science and technology. Since 2004, 
both countries have recognized each other as 
strategic partners.
Likewise, Venezuela and China have devel-
oped their bilateral relationship around ener-
gy and agriculture cooperation. In 2001, the 
two countries signed a strategic partnership, 
which was followed by the establishment of a 
Sino-Venezuelan commission for high-level ex-
change. Through the Sino-Venezuelan Joint Fi-
nancing Fund, China provides the Venezue-
lan regime with financial support for economic 
and social development projects. In fact, Vene-
zuela is the main beneficiary of Chinese infra-
structure projects in Latin America. 
Furthermore, China has been pursuing a 
soft power approach (opening Confucius In-
stitutes3 and offering material incentives such 
as credit lines and investment into local infra-
structure) to win the hearts and minds of its 
Latin American counterparts. Quite recently, 
Xi Jinping coined a new visionary concept for 
world politics, the “Chinese Dream,” which he 
defined in the following terms: “By the Chinese 
dream, we seek to have economic prosperity, 
national renewal and people’s well-being. The 
Chinese dream is about cooperation, develop-
ment, peace and win-win, and it is connected to 
the American dream and the beautiful dreams 
people in other countries may have.”
In China’s official rhetoric, this is a shared 
dream that reflects the demands and hopes of 
the rising economies to be accepted as equal 
3 So far, Confucius Institutes have been established in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, 
and Peru. These institutes promote the Chinese language and 
culture abroad and provide a forum for cultural exchange.
partners in global affairs. Xi’s statement thus 
resonates with his cooperation partners’ own 
development interests and thus increases 
China’s symbolic value as a reliable partner 
and advocate of this joint “dream” of wealth 
and power.
Space Quest
China’s engagement in Latin America also in-
cludes a strategic dimension: cooperation in 
aerospace technology. This aspect of China–
Latin America relations (cooperation between 
China and Brazil started in the 1980s) has long 
been neglected in academic research, and think 
tank analysts still disagree on how to interpret 
the spillover of this strategic cooperation to is-
sues of high politics. While some predict that 
these joint space programs will pose a threat to 
US national security (Ellis 2010), others argue 
that Chinese–Latin American space coopera-
tion does not follow any global ambitions but is 
mainly driven by national development inter-
ests (Delgado-López 2012:8). Although, space 
programs developed by Latin American coun-
tries with China are unlikely to constitute a di-
rect threat to the security of the United States, 
they do have implications for the competitive-
ness of countries and companies that operate 
in space.
Brazil has established the largest aerospace 
program in Latin America. The country signed 
a cooperation agreement in the field of aero-
space with the United States in 1983 and Chi-
na in 1988. The first outcome of the China-Bra-
zil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program 
was the launching of a satellite in October 1999, 
with over two-thirds of the construction work 
being carried out by the Chinese. In 2000, both 
countries agreed to develop a second genera-
tion of satellites through the CBERS program. 
They also set up a joint venture, the Interna-
tional Satellite Communication Company (IN-
SCOM). At the same time, however, Brazil at-
tempted to become more independent of the 
United States and China by cooperating with 
Russia in order to establish its own satellite 
launch site in 2004.4 
4 “Memorando de Entendimento entre o Ministério da Ciência 
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Another example of Chinese investment and 
cooperation in aerospace is the memorandum 
of understanding on aerospace technological 
cooperation it signed with Venezuela in Janu-
ary 2005. This agreement includes research co-
operation, development of the satellite indus-
try, TT&C cooperation,5 and professional train-
ing in operating satellites provided by the Chi-
nese. In 2008, Venezuela set up the Bolivarian 
Agency for Aerospace Activities (ABAE) with 
China as its preferential partner. Cooperation 
frameworks were signed with Bolivia (2011), 
Brazil (2008), India (2005), and Uruguay (2005). 
With the help of its Chinese partner, Venezue-
la launched its first two satellites in 2008 (Vene-
sat-1) and 2012 (VRSS-I). So far, Venezuela’s co-
operation with China has included the launch-
ing of these two satellites, the construction of 
two ground stations in Venezuela, and profes-
sional training. The majority of students en-
rolled in this training program have studied in 
China (90), India (38), and Brazil (14) (Acevedo/ 
Becerra/ Orihuela/Varela 2011:177). 
It should be noted that until 2008 Argentina 
and Brazil were the only states in Latin America 
that had their own satellite agencies. The new-
comers in the field are primarily those coun-
tries ruled by leftist governments that are seek-
ing to decrease their dependence on the Unit-
ed States. Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 
have all contracted the China Great Wall Indus-
try Corporation for the development and con-
trol of satellites; Nicaragua negotiated with the 
same company over the creation of the Nica-
sat-1 satellite. The cooperation and exchange 
of data between the Latin American aerospace 
nations is a central element of these countries’ 
dream to become more autonomous players in 
the regional and global context. Bolivia has al-
ready announced plans to sell 20 percent of its 
satellite images to other Latin American coun-
tries. 
In their initial stages, Latin America’s satel-
lite programs heavily relied on technology co-
operation with the United States (as in the case 
of Argentina) or European countries like France 
(as in the case of Brazil). However, there was no 
e Tecnologia da republica Federativa do Brasil e a Agencia 
Federal Espacial a respeito do Programa de Cooperação sobre 
Atividades Espaciais,” signed in Brasilia, 12 November 2004.
5 Telemetry, tracking and control (TT&C): http://satellites.
spacesim.org/english/anatomy/ttc/index.html.
transfer of technology as relations were limited 
to buyer-seller contracts. This changed when 
some Latin American countries started to na-
tionalize the telecommunication sector and to 
launch their own technological initiatives. Al-
though European and US telecommunication 
companies are still present in the region, Chi-
nese companies6 have recently concluded pref-
erential contracts with Argentina, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. China’s support 
for Latin America’s space technology includes 
investment in satellite construction, the launch-
ing of satellites from Chinese launch sites, and 
professional training of satellite operators. 
Latin America’s new multilateral efforts 
to set up a homegrown space program can be 
traced back to a meeting of the Union de Nacio-
nes Sudamericanas (UNASUR) member states’ 
defense ministers in Lima in November 2011. 
Joint space programs (based on shared knowl-
edge and joint investment), as the Argentinian 
defense minister stressed, would reduce pro-
duction costs and Latin America’s dependency 
on external suppliers.
Strategic Triangles and Cross-Regional 
Cooperation
Latin America, as the above-described dev-
elopment shows, is trying to decrease its over-
dependence on the United States and its tra-
ditional partners by setting up new region-
al institutions and organizations that facilitate 
the pooling of knowledge and resources and 
the reduction of transaction costs. Moreover, 
for technology transfer and financial support, 
these states are turning to China. However, this 
development – with the exception of Venezuela 
and some ALBA countries – does not indicate 
the substitution of one preferred cooperation 
partner for another. Latin America is adopt-
ing a multiangular approach, maintaining rela-
tions with a multitude of actors to safeguard its 
newly acquired autonomy.
Interactions between China and Latin Amer-
ica are primarily driven by national develop-
ment interests. In China’s case, this is the ac-
6 In the satellite sector, the China Great Wall Industry Cor-
poration agreed the sale of satellites to Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
and Venezuela. 
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cess to resources and support for its interests 
in international institutions; in Latin Ameri-
ca’s case, access to credits, technology transfer, 
and joint infrastructure projects. These projects 
thus do not directly target any third-country in-
terests. However, the new presence of Chinese 
companies and investors in the region might 
trigger an increasingly fierce competition for 
access to markets and resources. China’s new 
role in Latin America illustrates the country’s 
successful rise to great power status. With re-
gard to its rapid economic growth and “go-
ing out strategy,” some observers have predict-
ed an unavoidable clash between the United 
States and the emerging Asian giant (Brzezin-
ski/Mearsheimer 2005). Globalization and both 
players’ involvement in external regions have 
created a scenario where any such confronta-
tion is unlikely to be the result of conflict on 
the bilateral level between China and the Unit-
ed States directly, but rather stem from clashes 
over claims in these players’ respective strate-
gic backyards: Southeast Asia and Latin Amer-
ica.
The current Sino-US scramble for Latin 
America reveal that the United States, which 
partially reduced its engagement in its neigh-
borhood after 9/11 due to its commitment to the 
war on terror, is increasingly concerned about 
losing its grip on one of its historical spheres 
of influence. Similar to China, which has pro-
claimed a new kind of great power relations 
and announced its strategy to pay special atten-
tion to partnerships with rising economic pow-
ers, the United States is courting the rising re-
gional power center in their immediate neigh-
borhood: Brazil. Current diplomatic offers in-
clude far more than trade and economic is-
sues. During his May 2013 visit to Rio de Janei-
ro, Vice President Biden not only signed agree-
ments on energy, space cooperation, and de-
fense, but also talked about 2013 as the begin-
ning of “a new era of US-Brazilian relations” 
(Biden 2013). Cooperation has thus witnessed a 
spillover into the field of high politics.
Latin America’s new multiple cooperation 
opportunities have strengthened the region’s 
independence and its integration process. Co-
operation with international partners has pro-
vided the basis for these countries’ techno-
logical modernization, while the intraregion-
al coordination of aerospace technology might 
serve as a catalyst for further regional insti-
tutionalization. However, cross-regional alli-
ances (i.e., between China and selected Latin 
American states) will remain limited to sector 
cooperation and will not result in a new axis in 
world politics. One should not forget that dis-
agreements between Brazil and China are like-
ly to persist despite all efforts to formulate joint 
positions through the BRICS framework. For 
example, Brazil did not back China’s position 
in the so-called currency war with the United 
States, but pushed China to allow a faster ap-
preciation of the renminbi. 
One recent development trend, howev-
er, that will have to be further observed in the 
forthcoming years is China’s and the Unit-
ed States’ pursuit of a multidimensional ap-
proach to other world regions – which includes 
strengthening bilateral relations with select-
ed partners, establishing gateways to subre-
gions (in Asia, Latin America, and Europe) by 
courting those states that are seen as the most 
powerful representatives of these subregions, 
and turning to engagement with regional in-
stitutions and organizations. The latter groups 
serve as new “regional” dialogue partners that 
allow both China and the United States to in-
teract with selected groups of Latin American 
states instead of spending time and resourc-
es to address each state independently. This, 
again, might contribute to the further institu-
tionalization of the region’s community-build-
ing efforts in the long run.
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